










ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF TYING ARRANGEMENTS
 
 
JAY PIL CHOI 
 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1336 
CATEGORY 9: INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION 
NOVEMBER 2004 
 
PRESENTED AT CESIFO VENICE SUMMER INSTITUTE, WORKSHOP ON 










An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the CESifo website:           www.CESifo.de CESifo Working Paper No. 1336 
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It also discusses relevant antitrust cases concerned with tying arrangements in light of recent 
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 1. Introduction 
Tying arrangements recently have been a major and contentious issue in many high 
profile antitrust cases in the US and Europe.   Examples include the Microsoft case, the Visa 
and MasterCard case and the proposed GE/Honeywell merger.  More specifically, the 
Microsoft case in the US was concerned with bundling of the dominant Windows operating 
system with Internet Explorer, while the bundling of the operating system and Media Player 
was an issue in the European case.
1  The Visa and MasterCard case concerned with tying of 
debit and credit cards.  The case was settled with the two card associations agreeing to pay 
$2 billion and $1 billion, respectively, to a class of merchants and to lower their interchange 
fees.  In the GE/Honeywell case, one of the main issues raised by the proposed merger 
concerned the possibility of “bundling” and its likely impact on competition in the markets 
for jet aircraft engines and avionics.
2    The aim of this paper is to review recent 
developments in the antitrust analysis of tying arrangements and discusses relevant cases 
concerned with tying arrangements in light of recent theoretical advances in this area.  
It is well documented that tying arrangements can serve many purposes and 
numerous theories have been proposed to explain the motives for the practice and to find the 
ensuing anti-trust and welfare implications.   The most prominent view is that  they serve as 
a vehicle for price discrimination.   Papers in this tradition start with Stigler (1963) and 
include Adams and Yellen (1976), and Schmalensee (1984) among others.  They 
demonstrated that bundling can increase profit even in the absence of cost advantages to 
                                                 
1 The U.S. Department of Justice and Microsoft reached a settlement with Microsoft in November 2001.  The 
settlement agreement contains no provision for forced unbundling.  In the European case, the European Union 
ruled that Microsoft is guilty of abusing the "near-monopoly" of its Windows PC operating system and fined it 
a record 497 million euros ($613 million).  The case is being appealed by Microsoft.    
2 Another main issue that proved to be the stumbling block in the remedy negotiations between the merging 
parties and the Commission was the role and competitive implications of GECAS, GE’s aircraft leasing and 
financing arm.   The proposed merger was blocked by the European Commission in 2001 and the case is under 
appeal in the Court of First Instance of the European Union as of this writing. 
       2providing goods in combination or interdependency in demand for the component products.
3   
A variation on this theme is the metering argument in which the purchase of an indivisible 
machine is accompanied by the requirement that all complementary variable inputs be 
purchased from the same company.  By marking-up the variable inputs above marginal cost, 
the seller can price discriminate against intense users of the machine with the sale of 
variable inputs as a metering or monitoring device for the intensity of the machine usage.   
Other explanations given in this literature include monitoring the cheating on a cartel price, 
evasion of price controls, protection of goodwill reputation, economies of joint sales, etc.
 4   
The anti-competitive role of tying or bundling exemplified by the so-called "leverage 
theory" is more controversial.  According to the leverage theory, a multi-product firm with  
monopoly power in one market can monopolize another market that otherwise would have 
been competitive by using the leverage provided by the market power in the first market.  
By foreclosing sales in the second market, tying provides the mechanism to accomplish this.   
However, the logic of the theory has been criticized and subsequently dismissed by a 
number of authors from the University of Chicago school such as Bowman, Posner, and 
Bork who have argued that the use of leverage to affect the market structure of the tied good 
(second) market is impossible.   It was not until Whinston (1990) that the leverage theory 
was resuscitated with its first formal treatment.  Since then, the theory has been refined and 
extended in several directions.  Recent high profile cases of tying mentioned above also 
                                                 
3More general conditions for the optimality of bundling are provided in McAfee, McMillan and Whinston 
(1989).  They show that bundling is always optimal when reservation values are independently distributed in 
the population of consumers.  Recently, the Adams-Yellen framework has been generalized to allow the goods 
to be substitutes and complements.  For instance, Lewbel (1985) demonstrates that complementarity is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to make bundling optimal.     
4 For a comprehensive review of reasons for tying, see Nalebuff (2003) 
       3rekindled the interest in the antitrust analysis of tying and spawned a new line of research.  
This paper focuses on recent developments in this area.  
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way.  Section 2 describes the 
leverage theory of tying and the Chicago school criticism of its implausibility.  This was 
largely responsible for the replacement of leverage by price discrimination in the theory of 
tying before the leverage theory was revived by Whinston (1990).  The Chicago school’s 
contribution lies in revealing serious logical flaws in the early analysis of leverage and 
helping delineate conditions under which leverage theory does not apply.  Section 3 presents 
the contribution of Whinston (1990) who demonstrated that the Chicago school arguments 
have limitations and can break down in certain cases.  In particular, he argues that the 
Chicago school argument hinges crucially on the assumption that “the tied good market has 
a competitive, constant returns-to-scale structure.”
5   If scale economies exist and the 
structure of the tied good market is oligopolistic, tying can be an effective strategy for a 
monopolist to extend monopoly power to the tied good market by inducing exit by the rival 
firms.  I also describe subsequent work that identifies further conditions under which the 
Chicago school arguments may not hold.  Section 4 describes models of tying that 
incorporate incentives to innovate.  This literature demonstrates that even in the absence of 
exit by the rival firm (hence, no changes in the market structure in the tied good market), 
tying can be a profitable strategy via its long-term effects on competition through 
innovation.  Section 5 discusses tying in the context of merger analysis in complementary 
markets.   Section 6 discusses tying in the so-called two-sided markets that are characterized 
by inter-group network externalities.   Section 7 concludes by discussing antitrust policy 
implications. 
                                                 
5 Whinston (1990), p. 838. 
       42. The Leverage Theory of Tying and the Chicago School Criticism 
The key intellectual rationale for the historically harsh treatment of tying arrangements by 
the courts in the US has been the so-called “leverage theory.”
6  According to the leverage 
theory of tying, a multiproduct firm with monopoly power in one market can monopolize a 
second market using the leverage provided by its monopoly power in the first market.  The 
theory, however, came under attack and was largely discredited as a result of criticisms 
originating in the Chicago School (see e.g. Bowman 1957, Posner 1976, Bork 1978).
7   
The Chicago school criticism can be explained by the following simple model.  
Consider two independent products, A and B.  They are unrelated in the sense that they can 
be consumed independently and their values to consumers are independent of whether they 
are consumed separately or together.
8  Consumers, whose total measure is normalized to 1, 
are assumed to be identical and have a unit demand for each product valued at vA and vB, 
respectively.  To focus on the strategic motive for bundling, I assume that there is no cost 
advantage or disadvantage associated with bundling.  The market for product A is 
monopolized by firm 1 with unit production cost of cA (< vA).   It is assumed that entry into 
market A is not feasible.  Firm 1 may have a patent or have an installed base that makes 
entry unprofitable in the presence of network externalities (Farrell and Saloner, 1986).  The 
market for product B, however, is served by two firms, firm 1 and firm 2, who engage in 
Bertrand competition.  For simplicity, product B is assumed to be homogeneous. Unit 
                                                 
6 The leading case is Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).  
Other cases include International Salt v. U.S., 332 U.S. 392 (1947) and Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. U.S., 
356 U.S. 1 (1958).  
7 Bowman, for instance, claims that "leveraging, in a word, is no more plausible than lifting oneself by ones 
bootstraps."  These arguments, often associated with the University of Chicago oral tradition, are traceable to 
Aaron Director.  
8 The Chicago school criticism applies equally to the case of complementary products.   See Whinston (2001) 
for more details. 
       5production costs for product B are given by cB1 and cB2 for firm 1 and firm 2, respectively.  
Both firms are already in the market and have paid sunk costs of entry, if there are any.
9  In 
such a case of no exclusion of the rival firm, tying is always a weakly dominated strategy if 
the production cost of each firm is given and cannot be altered.
10  To see this, I consider the 
following two-stage game. 
  In the first stage, firm 1 (the monopolistic supplier of product A) decides whether or 
not to bundle the two products.  A price game ensues in the second stage with the bundling 
decision in the previous stage as given.  The timing assumption reflects the fact that the 
bundling decision through product design is a longer term decision that cannot be easily 
modified as compared to the price decision.  The outcomes are described below and depend 
on each firm's bundling decision in the first stage. 
2.1. No Bundling 
  If the two products are not bundled, they can be analyzed independently. With the 
assumption of identical consumers and rectangular demand, firm 1 can extract the whole 
consumer surplus in market A and have profits of (vA− cA).   In market B, the low cost 
producer serves the whole market at the price of max (cB1, cB2).  Thus, firm 1 will have the 
profit of max [cB2− cB1, 0] in market B.  Thus, the overall profit for the monopolist is given 
by  
Π1 = (vA− cA) + max [cB2 − cB1,  0]      (1) 
2.2. Bundling 
                                                 
9 Thus, entry and exit are not issues in this model.  This turns out to be an important assumption, as explained 
in section 3.   
10 This result also holds for the case of complementary products.  See Choi (1996) and Farrell et al. (1998). 
       6  Suppose that the monopolist bundles product A and B and charges the price of P for 
the bundled product.  In this case, consumers have two choices.  The first option is to buy 
the bundled product from the monopolist at the price of P and the second one is to buy only 
product B from firm 2.   For the first option to be chosen by the consumers, P should satisfy 
the following condition:  
    v A+ vB – P ≥ vB – cB2      (2) 
This implies that the maximum price the tying firm can charge for the bundled product is 
given by P = vA + cB2.  Firm 1’s profit selling at that price is given by (vA + cB2) – (cA + 
cB1) = (vA − cA) + (cB2 − cB1).  Thus, firm 1’s profit with bundling is given by  
1
~ Π = max [(vA − cA) + (cB2 − cB1),  0]    (3)   
Thus,  1
~ Π < Π1 unless firm 1 has cost advantages in market B, in which case it can be 
verified that bundling has no effect ( 1
~ Π = Π1).
 11   This implies that firm 1 never has the 
incentive to bundle for the purpose of monopolizing the tied good market.  As a result, price 
discrimination, as opposed to leverage, has come to be seen as the main motivation for tying 
(Stigler 1963, Adams and Yellen 1976, McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston 1986).   
Note that given cost levels for each firm, non-bundling promotes static efficiency 
since it leads to production of B by the most efficient supplier.   With bundling, however, 
production can come from the tying firm even though it has a higher cost of B as long as the 
cost disadvantage (cB1 − cB2) is less than the surplus available in market A (sA= vA− cA).  In 
this simple model, the social and private incentives for (un)bundling coincide. 
 
                                                 
11 Variables corresponding to bundling are denoted by a tilde. 
       73. The Revival of the Leverage Theory 
Recently, however, Whinston (1990) has revived the leverage theory of tying.  He 
shows that if the market structure in the tied good market is oligopolistic and scale 
economies are present, tying can be an effective and profitable strategy to alter market 
structure by making continued operation unprofitable for tied good rivals.  To understand 
Whinston’s argument, I now modify the two stage game analyzed above such that firm 2 
makes an entry decision after firm 1’s bundling decision.  The entry entails sunk fixed costs.  
More specifically, consider the following three-stage game.   
In the first stage, firm 1 (the monopolistic supplier of product A) decides whether or 
not to bundle the two products.   In the second stage, firm 2 makes its entry decision given 
firm 1’s bundling decision.  If it decides to enter the market, it pays a sunk cost of K.
12   If 
there is entry by firm 2, a price game ensues in the final stage.  The bundling decision is 
assumed to be irreversible.  Thus, the model applies to physical or technical tying rather 
than contractual tying.
13   
I apply backward induction to solve the game.  The outcomes in the final stage are 
the same as above if there is entry.   If there is no entry, firm 1 charges (vA + vB) if the 
products are bundled, and vA and vB for products A and B, respectively, if the two products 
are not bundled.  In either case, firm 1 gets the monopoly profits of (vA + vB) −  (cA + cB1) 
without entry by firm 2.  
                                                 
12 If firm 2 is already in the market, it can avoid a fixed cost of operation K by exiting from the industry. 
13 One example of technical tying through product design is Microsoft’s integration of Internet Explorer (web 
browser program) and Media Player into its operating system.  By designing these application programs to 
share the same files called dynamic linked libraries, it is difficult to remove them without jeopardizing the 
stability of the operating system.   
       8Now suppose that  K< cB2 - cB1 < (vA− cA).   The first inequality means that firm 2 
can successfully enter the market B if there was no bundling since its cost advantage is more 
than the sunk cost of entry.  However, the second inequality implies that the cost advantage 
for firm 2 is not sufficiently high to compete against the bundled products since firm 1 is 
still able to sell the bundled products with a positive profit even if firm 2 priced its product 
at its marginal cost cB2, i.e.,  1
~ Π = (vA − cA) + (cB2 − cB1) > 0.  Thus, firm 2 is foreclosed 
from market B since it cannot recoup its sunk cost of entry when firm 1 engages in 
bundling.    
Let sA= vA  − c A (>0) denote the monopoly surplus in market A.  One way to 
interpret the result above is that after bundling firm 1 behaves as if its cost of B were cB1 − 
sA.  The reason is that after bundling firm 1 can realize the monopoly surplus of sA only in 
conjunction with the sale of product B.  Thus, the firm is willing to sell product B up to the 
loss of sA.  This implies that firm 1 will price more aggressively after bundling and capture a 
larger market share in market B.
14  The Chicago school criticism of the leverage theory of 
tying missed this "strategic effect" due to their adherence to the assumption of competitive, 
constant returns-to-scale structure in the tied good market.  It is important to keep in mind, 
however, that in Whinston’s basic model, inducing the exit of the rival firm is essential for 
the profitability of tying arrangements.
15  Thus, if the competitor has already paid the sunk 
cost of entry and there is no avoidable fixed cost, tying cannot be a profitable strategy.
16  
                                                 
14 In the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), bundling is a "top dog" strategy, while non-bundling 
softens price competition and is a "puppy dog" strategy. (See Tirole 1988 for a discussion of the taxonomy of 
business strategies.)   
15 Whinston (1990) points out that if heterogeneity of consumer preferences is allowed for the tying good, 
tying can also serve as a price discriminating device and exclusion of the rival firm is not necessary for the 
profitability of tying.  See also Carbajo et al. (1990).   
16 In a related paper, Carbajo, De Meza and Seidmann (1990) also provide a strategic incentive for bundling.  
However, they are not concerned with the rival's entry or exit decisions.  Instead, they show that bundling may 
       9The analysis of Whinston has been subsequently extended in several directions by 
various authors such as Carlton and Waldman (2002), Choi and Stefanadis (2001) and 
Nalebuff (2004).  Whinston’s model assumes that entry into the monopolized market is 
impossible and shows how tying can be used to extend monopoly power in one market into 
an otherwise competitive market.  These papers, in contrast, consider an oligopolistic 
environment and show that bundling can be used to deter entry into a complementary 
market to preserve the monopolized market or strengthen market power across several 
markets.   
The basic intuition for these results in Carlton and Waldman (2002) and in Choi and 
Stefanadis (2001) is that entry in one market is dependent on the success of entry in a 
complementary market.   Carlton and Waldman develop a dynamic model where an entrant 
with a superior complementary product today can enter the primary product market in the 
future.  They show that bundling can be used to deny an entrant sales when it has only the 
complementary product and this reduced sales today can prevent future entry into the 
primary market in the presence of scale economies.  In Choi and Stefanadis (2001), entry 
takes place through innovation.  They show that bundling reduces entrants’ R&D incentives 
and hence the probability of entry since success in both products is required to gain access 
to the market.    
                                                                                                                                                      
be profitable because it induces one's rival to price less aggressively.   The reason is due to the assumption in 
their model that consumers are heterogeneous and can have different reservation values.  However, for a given 
individual the reservation prices for the two goods are identical.   In their model, tie-in provides a partitioning 
mechanism to sort consumers into groups with different reservation price characteristics.  The firm with 
bundled products sells to high reservation value consumers while the competitor sells to low reservation value 
consumers.   As a result, the rival firm can raise its price in equilibrium.  The overall effect on the market is a 
relaxation of competition.  See also Chen (1997). 
 
       10Nalebuff (2004) considers a situation in which an incumbent with two independent 
products faces one product entrant.  He analyzes the strategy of bundling as an entry 
deterrence device when the incumbent does not know in which market the entry will take 
place.   Nalebuff shows that bundling allows the incumbent to credibly defend both products 
without having to lower prices in each market.   
4. Tying and Innovation 
Whinston’s paper mainly focuses on the effects of tying on pricing incentives.  In 
Choi (1996, 2004), I extend Whinston’s model by introducing R&D incentives and uncover 
another channel through which tying can affect competition.  As demonstrated by the recent 
Microsoft case, this extension is especially important in understanding tying incentives in 
innovative industries.
17  
To highlight the importance of R&D, I abstract from the issue of entry/ exit by the 
rival firm and consider a model in which bundling is not profitable in the absence of R&D 
competition.   Instead, I show that the profitability of tying can be established through its 
effect on R&D incentives. As shown in Section 2, with price competition only, using 
bundling to increase market share in the tied good market is not a profitable strategy in 
itself.  However, bundling also affects R&D competition. The tying firm’s R&D incentives 
in the tied good market increase since it can spread out the costs of R&D over a larger 
number of units, whereas the rival firms’ R&D incentives decrease.  If this positive effect 
                                                 
17 See also Gilbert and Riordan (2003) who show that a monopoly supplier of an essential system component 
may have an incentive to engage in technological tying when firms invest to improve their products.  In 
contrast to Choi (2004), they consider tying of two complementary products and assume that the wholesale 
price of the essential component controlled by the tying firm is fixed and cannot be used to extract rents from 
more efficient rivals of the complementary product. 
       11via R&D competition dominates the negative effect via price competition, tying can be 
beneficial for the tying firm even in the absence of exit by the rival firms 
More specifically, I analyze a three-stage game identical to that in section 2, except 
that firms engage in R&D competition before the pricing game, thereby endogenizing the 
final production cost of each firm.  That is, in the first stage, the monopolistic supplier of 
product A decides whether or not to bundle it with the competitively supplied product B.  
As in Whinston (1990) and Carbajo et al. (1990), I assume that this precommitment is made 
possible through costly investments in product design and the production process.  In the 
second stage, the two firms engage in cost reducing R&D activities.  A price game ensues in 
the third and final stage, with the cost structure inherited from the realizations of R&D.  As 
usual, I solve the game via backward induction.  The analysis of the pricing game stage is 
the same as in Section 2 above.    
  To focus on the impact of tying arrangements on R&D competition in the tied good 
market, I ignore the possibility of R&D in market A and focus on the incentives for R&D in 
market B.
18  Let m1 and m2 be the levels of cost-reducing R&D investments by firm 1 and 
firm 2, respectively.  The R&D outcomes are stochastic and independent across firms: let x1 
and x2 denote the cost realizations after R&D for firm 1 and firm 2.  Then, x1 is a random 
variable drawn from [0, c1] by a c.d.f. F(.|m1) with positive density f(.|m1) for all m1>0.  
Similarly, x2 is a random variable drawn from a c.d.f. G(.|m2) with positive density g(.|m2)  
with all m2>0.   Let Fm1(.|m1)  and Fm1m1(.|m1) be the partial derivative and the second 
partial derivative of F(.|m1)  with respect to m1, respectively. Gm2(.|m2) and Gm2m2(.|m2) 
are defined analogously.   I make the following assumptions. 
                                                 
18In Choi (1996), in contrast, the leverage of monopoly power occurs as a result of creating an interdependence 
of R&D competition between the two product markets.  Thus, the model in the present paper abstracts from 
this mechanism by assuming the R&D possibility in only one market.  
       12Assumption 1. Fm1(.|m1) >0, Gm2(.|m2) >0, Fm1m1(.|m1)<0, and Gm2m2(.|m2)<0 for all 
m1, m2, x1 ∈(0, c1) and x2 ∈(0, c2). 
Assumption 2. Fm1(x1|0) = ∞, Gm2(x2|0) = ∞, Fm1(x1|∞) = 0, Gm2(x2|∞) = 0, for all x1 
∈(0, c1) and x2 ∈(0, c2). 
Assumption 1 means that raising investment in R&D reduces cost in the sense of (reverse) 
first-order stochastic dominance, and does so at a diminishing rate.  Assumption 2 is a 
boundary condition that guarantees an interior Nash equilibrium in R&D investments.   
4.1. No Bundling  
  In this case, consumers’ purchase decisions for each product are independent of each 
other, which implies that each market can be analyzed separately.  
  Given firm 2’s investment level m2, firm 1 chooses m1 to maximize the following 
expression:  
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where the last line follows by integration by parts.  The first order condition for the optimal 
investment level of firm 1 is given by: 
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Equations (5) and (6) implicitly define firm 1’s and 2’s reaction functions, respectively, mi 
       13= Ri(mj), where i=1,2 and i≠j.  Total differentiation of the first-order conditions yields the 
result that Ri ′ < 0.  Let m1* and m2* be the Nash equilibrium R&D investment levels under 
nonbundling. Then, (m1*, m2*) can be derived by finding the intersection of the two 
reaction functions.  I further assume that | Ri ′|<1.  This ensures the uniqueness and the 
stability of the Nash equilibrium. 
4.2. Bundling  
  Without bundling, firm 1 sells product B only in the event of S = 
.  In other words, any marginal cost reduction from 
investing in R&D is useful only when the event S occurs.  With bundling, firm 1 behaves as 
if its cost of product B were (
]} | ] , 0 [ ] , 0 [ ) , {( 2 1 2 1 2 1 x x c c x x ≤ × ∈
1 x ) A s − , where sA = vA- cA (>0).  Thus, firm 1 sells the 
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than set S.  In the event of set S
~
, the tying firm’s profit (gross of R&D investment cost) is 
given by ( .   Thus, given firm 2’s investment level m2, the tying firm’s 
optimization problem is to maximize the following expression: 
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where the last line once again follows by integration by parts.  The first order condition for 
the optimal investment level of firm 1 is given by: 
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Equation (8) implicitly defines firm 1’s reaction function under bundling, m ~
1=  1
~
R ( ).   m2




R ( ) > m1 = R1(m2): firm 1 has greater incentives for R&D after bundling.  The 
reason for this result is that the marginal cost reduction through R&D translates into profits 
conditional on the firm being able to sell product B.  With tying arrangements, the set of 
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  In contrast, firm 2’s chances of selling product B decrease with firm 1’s tying 
arrangements.  Thus, firm 2’s R&D incentives are reduced as a result of bundling.  To verify 
this, note that the first order condition for firm 2’s optimal investment level is given by: 
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Equation (9) defines firm 2’s reaction function under bundling, m ~
2 =  2
~
R ( ).  The 
comparison of (6) and (9) gives the desired result, that is, for any given level of m , 
m1
1 = 
( ) < m2 = R2(m1).  Let m ~
1* and m ~
2* denote the Nash equilibrium R&D investment 
levels for the firm 1 (the tying firm) and firm 2 (the rival firm), respectively, under 
bundling. Then, (m ~
1*, m ~
2*) can be derived as the intersection of the two reaction functions 
 and  . 
With bundling by firm 1, both firms’ reaction curves shift.  To analyze the effects of 
bundling on R&D incentives, it is more convenient to consider the change in equilibrium as 
a result of sequential shifts of the two reaction curves (see Figure 1).  Let (m *, m *) be the 




R (m ) and R2(m1).  Since  2 ( ) is an outward shift of R1(m2), we 
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of R2(m1), which implies that m
m1
~
1*> * and m m ˆ1 ~ *< *.   Thus, we have m m ˆ 2 ~
1* > m1* and 
 
19 See Bulow et al. (1985) for the details of the proof. 
       15m ~
2* <m2*.  Thus, we can conclude that with bundling, the tying firm’s R&D investment 
level increases (m ~
1* > m1*), and the rival firm’s R&D investment level decreases (m ~
2* 
<m2*).   This result renders some credibility to the argument that tying by a dominant firm 
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  In my model, market foreclosure does not necessarily lead to exclusion of the rival 
firm. Rather, market foreclosure in the product market translates into foreclosure in R&D 
markets.  In the static model of price competition where the industry rent is fixed, bundling 
       16reduces the tying firm’s overall profits since it intensifies the effective price competition in 
the tied good market.  However, in the presence of dynamic rents that can be created 
through R&D, bundling may be a profitable strategy.   The change in R&D incentives 
through bundling enables the tying firm to capture a larger share of the dynamic rents.  If 
this effect outweighs the negative effect of more aggressive price competition, bundling will 
be a privately optimal strategy even in the absence of exit by the rival firm.    
An important question for antitrust policy is whether, in the presence of R&D 
competition, bundling is socially beneficial. In this model, the answer to this question rests 
on the nature of R&D competition, and there are two aspects of R&D to consider in 
evaluating its efficiency.  R&D competition can promote a diversity of research lines and 
thus increase the aggregate probability of success (the level of cost reduction) if the outcome 
of research project is uncertain.  On the other hand, R&D competition can also result in the 
duplication of research efforts to the extent that their outcomes are correlated (Dasgupta and 
Maskin, 1987).  The desirability of unfettered R&D competition hinges on the trade-off 
between diversity and duplication.    
  To explore welfare implications further, consider the following simple specification 
of the R&D process.  Each firm has the option of engaging in fixed intensity R&D activities, 
the cost of which is given by I.   The outcome of R&D is modeled as a random draw for the 
firm’s production cost.  Let me further assume that the two firms are symmetric.  They have 
the same initial cost, c (cB1 = cB2 = c), and have access to the same technology.
20  
Specifically, if firm i invests in R&D at cost I, its production cost will be given by a 
realization of the random variable xi, drawn from [0, c] with  c.d.f. F(.) and with positive 
density f(.).  With this specification of R&D, let me analyze each firm’s incentive to engage 
                                                 
20 See the Appendix for an analysis of the asymmetric case. 
       17in R&D activities depending on whether or not firm 1 bundles.  Note that by assuming 
symmetry in the initial costs I abstract away from the issue of the static efficiency of 
bundling. 
Define µ11 = E[xj − xi | xj > xi] and µ10=E[c − xi], where xi and xj denote the post 
R&D costs for firm i and firm j, respectively, j≠i.  In other words, µ11 is the expected cost 
advantage of a firm when it has a lower post R&D cost compared to its rival firm, assuming 
that the rival firm is also engaged in R&D.  In contrast, µ10  denotes the expected cost saving 
from R&D and is the expected cost advantage of a firm when it is the only firm engaged in 
R&D.  Thus, µ10 > µ11>0. 
To simplify the analysis, I further assume that that sA= vA − cA is sufficiently large 
that x1 − sA is always less than x2.
21   This implies that once the two products are bundled 
the tying firm always finds it optimal to sell the bundled product, regardless of the R&D 
outcomes, and forecloses the rival firm.  It should be emphasized that the simplifying 
assumption is made purely for expositional simplicity and is not crucial for the analysis. 
Even if I consider the possibility that the tying firm cannot sell the bundled product 
profitably (i.e., x1 – sA > x2) the main qualitative result will not change. The partial market 
foreclosure due to bundling reduces R&D incentives for the rival firm.  However, with the 
assumption above, it is immediate that firm 2 has no incentive to invest in R&D since it 
knows that it will be completely foreclosed from market B. Given this fact, the tying firm 
will invest in R&D if and only if I is less than µ10 =E[c − xi], which is the expected cost 
saving from R&D. 
                                                 
21 A sufficient condition for this to hold is that sA= vA − cA > cB1.  If this condition holds, the tying firm will 
still sell the bundled product even in the case where the rival firm reduces its production cost to zero and the 
tying firm maintains its initial production cost.  
       18  In contrast, without bundling the equilibrium in R&D is characterized in the 
following way: 
 (i)If I ∈ L = [0, µ11], both firms invest in R&D.   
(ii)If I ∈ M = (µ11, µ10), there are two (asymmetric) pure strategy equilibria in which either 
only firm 1 or only firm 2 invests in R&D and there is one (symmetric) mixed strategy 







.    
(iii)If I ∈ H = [µ10, ∞), neither firm invests in R&D. 
Finally, the socially optimal configuration of R&D investment is given by: 
 (i)If I ∈ L = [0, µ11], both firms should invest in R&D.   
(ii)If I ∈ M = [µ11, µ10], only one firm should invest in R&D.  
(iii)If I ∈ H = [µ10, ∞), neither firm should invest in R&D. 
Combining all the results above, the effects of tying on welfare can be summarized 
in the following way (see Figure 2).  If I ∈ L, the benefit of R&D diversification outweighs 
the cost of duplication.  Thus, it is better to have both firms engage in R&D.  In this case, 
nonbundling results in both firms investing in R&D, and the private and social incentives 
coincide.  Bundling, however, eliminates firm 2’s incentives to invest in R&D by 
foreclosing the market for firm 2.  As a result, there is dynamic inefficiency associated 
bundling. 
  If I ∈ M, in contrast, the benefit of R&D diversification is outweighed by the cost 
of duplication.  Thus, it is better to have only one firm engage in R&D.   Bundling ensures 
that the private and social incentives coincide.  Without bundling, whether private incentives 
       19result in socially optimal outcomes depends upon which of the multiple equilibria are 
selected. If one of the two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria is chosen, the private 
incentives again coincide with the socially optimal incentives.  However, if the symmetric 
mixed strategy equilibrium is played, bundling improves dynamic efficiency.  The reason is 
that with the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, the dynamic rents associated with R&D 
are completely dissipated with competition.  Thus, in this case, bundling can serve as a 
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Figure 2. Market Equilibrium vs. Socially Optimal Outcome 
 
       205. Merger with Bundling in Complementary Markets 
  The possibility of bundling also has played an important role in merger analysis in 
complementary markets since a merger between producers of complementary goods enables 
the merging firms to offer the products sold independently prior to the merger as a bundle.   
This possibility became a stumbling block for the proposed merger between GE and 
Honeywell in the aerospace industry.  Choi (2003) provides a framework to analyze the 
effects of mergers in complementary markets when the merged firm can engage in 
bundling.
22 
Consider two complementary components, A and B, which consumers combine in 
fixed proportions on a one-to-one basis to form a final product.  For instance, A and B can 
be considered as operating systems and application software, respectively, to form a 
computer system.  In the case of the proposed GE/Honeywell merger, they correspond to 
engines and avionics to form an aircraft.   
I assume that there are two differentiated brands of each of the two components A 
(A1 and A2) and B (B1 and B2).  There are four ways to form a composite product, A1B1, 
A1B2, A2B1, and A2B2.   Let me denote the price of brand Ai by pi and the price of brand Bj 
by qj, where i=1,2 and j=1,2.   Then the composite product AiBj is available at the total 




                                                 
22  Choi’s (2003) framework is an extension of Economides and Salop (1992) who analyze a model of 
competition with complementary products in which they derive equilibrium prices for a variety of 
organizational and market structures that differ in their degree of competition and integration.  However, they 
limit the strategy space of the merged entity and do not consider the possibility of bundling.   See also Choi 
(2001) for a discussion of the GE/Honeywell merger. 
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ij denote demand for the composite product AiBj.   The demand function for the 
components then can be derived from the demand functions for the composite goods.   For 
instance, component Ai is sold as a part of composite goods AiB1 and AiB2.  Thus, the 










For simplicity, I assume the following linear and symmetric demand system: 
D
11(s11, s12, s21, s22 )  = a –b s11+ c s12+d s21+ e s22 
D
12(s12, s11, s22, s21 )  = a –b s12+ c s11+d s22+ e s21 
D
21(s21, s22, s11, s12 )  = a –b s21+ c s22+d s11+ e s12 
D
22(s22, s21, s12, s11 )  = a –b s22+ c s21+d s12+ e s11, where a, b, c, d, e>0. 
       22To ensure that composite goods are gross substitutes, it is assumed that b> c+ d+ e, where    
the “a” parameter represents the market size, the “b” parameter represents the own-price 
elasticity of demand for that system, and  the  “c, d, e” parameters represent the cross-price 
elasticity of demand across systems.   Without loss of generality, I assume that constant unit 
production costs are zero.23    
In such a framework, Choi (2003) analyzes how the market equilibrium changes 
after a merger between A1 and B1 when the merged firms engage in mixed bundling.  The 
main results are summarized as follows: 
1. The merged firm will reduce the price of its bundled system and expand market share 
relative to the situation prior to the merger. Prior to the merger, any price cut by one of the 
merging firms will tend to benefit the other’s sales. In the absence of the merger, neither 
party will take account of this benefit of a price cut on the other’s sales. Following the 
merger, however, the merged entity can “internalize” these “pricing externalities” arising 
from the complementarity of their components by reducing the price of the bundle to below 
the level the two players would choose if acting independently.
24  This will expand the 
merged firm’s sales and market share. 
2. The merged firm will raise the prices of its stand-alone components, relative to their 
levels prior to the merger.  The merged firm has less to lose from raising its stand-alone 
prices because a proportion of those customers that switch away from the stand-alone 
components as a result of the price increase will simply switch to the bundle offered by the 
                                                 
23 If there are positive constant unit production costs, the prices in the model can be interpreted as per unit 
margins. 
24 Cournot (1838) was the first to note that mergers among complements reduce prices.  He considered the 
merger of two monopolists that produce complementary goods (zinc and copper) that are used as inputs for a 
final good (brass).  My model extends his analysis to a case where both input producers face oligopolistic 
competition. 
       23merged firm rather than to the competing system from independent firms. As such, the 
merged party will have an increased incentive to set high prices for its components. This 
raises the price of “mix-and-match” systems (i.e. systems including a component of the 
merged firm alongside a competitor’s component) and makes them less attractive to buyers. 
3. In response to the price cut by the merged firm for their bundled system and the price 
increase for the ‘mix-and-match' systems, the independent rivals will cut price in order to 
retain some market share. However, they will not cut their prices as much as the merged 
firm (i.e. their system will remain more expensive than the bundled system of the merged 
firm) since – in the absence of counter-merger - they cannot internalize the externality 
arising from the complementarity of their components. As a result, they will fail to recapture 
all of their prior market shares.  The merger would therefore reduce the profits of the 
merged firm’s competitors. This reduction in profits follows directly from the combination 
of a loss of market share and the need to cut prices.  Thus, there is a distinct possibility of 
exit by outside rival firms.  
  As an example, consider the case where a=b=1 and c=d=e=1/4 (see Figure 4).   Then 
it can be shown that with the independent ownership (pre-merger) structure, 
= = =  =4/5.   The total price of each composite good is 8/5 and each firm gets  






1 and B1, the merged entity (A1-B1) charges 
=11/8 for the bundle and  1
~ p  =  1
~ q  =1 for separate components.   Thus, it offers discount 
for the bundle (11/8 < 1+1=2).  Independent producers, A2 and B2, charge  2
~ p  = 2
~ q  = ¾ for 
their component products.  Thus, the prices for composite products, A1B1, A1B2, A2B1, and 
A2B2 are given by 11/8, 7/4, 7/4, and 3/2, respectively, where 7/4>3/2>11/8.   After the 
merger A1-B1 receives the profits of 129/64 (>24/25+24/25), whereas independent 
producers get 27/32 (<24/25).  This implies that A1 and B1 together increase their combined 
profits after merger while independent producers’ profits decrease.   
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Figure 4: Diagrammatic representation of post -merger per unit margins  
(with a = b =1, c =d = e=1/4) 
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The analysis suggests that a merger with bundling in complementary markets may 
have both anticompetitive effects and efficiency benefits.  The efficiency benefits, for 
instance, take the form of internalizing pricing extenalities for the merged firm.   The 
potential anticompetitive effects would take the form of market foreclosure, over either the 
short or the medium term. If the financial impact of the merged firm’s bundling made its 
rivals unable to cover their fixed costs of production, their short-term exit could be 
expected. Alternatively, even if their post-merger profitability enabled them to remain in the 
market over the short term, it might not justify new R&D investment or capital expenditure. 
This would have serious consequences for their viability over the medium term.  
       25Even in the absence of such foreclosure effects, mixed bundling by the merging 
parties could adversely affect consumer and social welfare. With heterogeneous consumer 
preferences, some buyers gain and others lose. For instance, those who previously 
purchased both products from the two merging firms would gain due to the lower bundle 
price. However, those who purchased a “mix and match” system and wished to continue 
doing so would suffer due to the increased stand-alone prices charged by the merged firm.   
In Choi (2003), I conduct a welfare analysis by numerical simulation under the assumption 
that  c=d=e<1/3.  I find that there could be significant welfare loss when c (cross-
substitutability parameter) is sufficiently large.  When c is close to zero, each system is 
essentially a separate product, and there is little direct competition between systems.  In this 
case, the structure of each system market is equivalent to the one considered by Cournot and 
mergers are welfare enhancing.   In cases with high degrees of substitutability and intense 
competition among systems (i.e., high c), however, the model suggests that the effects of 
mergers on social welfare are negative.   
In Choi (2003), I also analyze the effects of a merger with pure bundling under 
which the firm only sells the bundle and does not make the individual components available 
individually.  While the analysis of mixed bundling is more appropriate in the short-run, the 
possibility of pure bundling can be important for the long run analysis since the merged firm 
can practice pure bundling in the form of technical tying when it develops new generations 
of products by making its products available only as an integrated system, incompatible with 
the individual components offered by outside suppliers.  With a simulation analysis, I show 
that for most parameter values pure bundling is less profitable than mixed bundling for the 
merged entity.  It is also shown that outsiders’ profits are affected more adversely with pure 
bundling.  I can conclude that the merged firm will not practice pure bundling since mixed 
bundling yields higher profits as an accommodation strategy.  However, as in Whinston 
       26(1990), pure bundling can be still profitable if the exclusion of rivals through predation is 
possible with pure bundling, but not with mixed bundling.   
6. Tying in Two-Sided Markets 
Motivated by the recent tying cases involving credit card payment systems and 
Microsoft, a few studies analyze the effects of tying arrangements on platform competition 
in so-called two-sided markets. A favorite example to illustrate the defining characteristics 
of two-sided markets is dating services or nightclubs where each member of two distinct 
groups of people (men and women) derives value from interacting with members of the 
other group.  In this example, members of each group obviously derive higher utility as 
more people from the other group patronize the same dating service or nightclub.  This type 
of inter-group network externality is not limited to dating services.  Other examples with 
more significant economic importance include auction sites such as eBay and Yahoo where 
buyers and sellers get together to consummate a deal, credit card payment systems such as 
Visa and MasterCard where both merchants and consumers need to participate in the same 
system, video game platforms such as PlayStation, X-box and GameCube where game 
developers and consumers constitute the two distinct sides, etc.
25
   In such markets, the need 
to get all sides of the market to get on board creates a so-called “chicken and egg” problem 
(Caillaud and Jullien, 2003) in that members of each group are willing to participate in the 
market only if they expect many members from the other side to participate.  The 
burgeoning literature on two-sided markets is mainly concerned with the optimal pricing 
structure to coordinate the demands of distinct groups of customers.  Formal economic 
                                                 
25 See Evans (2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2003a) for more examples of multi-sided markets. 
       27analysis of tying that explicitly accounts for the peculiarities of two-sided markets, however, 
is scarce.
26  Two exceptions are Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Choi (2004).  
More specifically, Rochet and Tirole (2003b) provide an economic analysis of the 
tying practice initiated by payments card associations Visa and MasterCard in which 
merchants who accept their credit cards were forced also to accept their debit cards.  This 
tie-in practice, the so-called “honor-all-cards” rule, has been challenged recently by major 
merchants including Walmart in a class action suit. In the class action suit on behalf of 
thousands of retailers, the stores argued that Visa and MasterCard unfairly required 
merchants to accept their debit cards, which require a customer's signature to verify a 
transaction, to exclude PIN-based on-line debit cards.  They show that in the absence of 
tying, the interchange fee between the merchant’s and the cardholder’s banks on debit is too 
low and tends to be too high on credit compared to the social optimum.  Tying is shown to 
be a mechanism to rebalance the interchange fee structure and raise social welfare.   
  In Choi (2004), I develop a preliminary model that reflects the Microsoft case in the 
EC where it has been alleged that the company’s tying practice of requiring Windows 
operating system users to accept its Windows Media Player software is predatory and hurts 
digital media rivals such as RealNetworks.
27  In this streaming media software case, content 
providers and consumers constitute the two sides of the market.
28   
                                                 
26  The general economics of multi-sided markets are provided in Armstrong (2002), Rochet and Tirole 
(2003a), and Caillaud and Jullien (2003) 
27 On March 24, 2004, the European Union ruled that Microsoft is guilty of abusing the "near-monopoly" of its 
Windows PC operating system and fined it a record 497 million euros ($613 million).  The case is being 
appealed by Microsoft.   On December 18, 2003, streaming-media provider RealNetworks also sued Microsoft 
on antitrust charges in the US court, claiming that Microsoft wielded its “monopoly power to restrict how PC 
makers install competing media players while forcing every Windows user to take Microsoft’s media player, 
whether they want it or not.”  See New York Times, December 19, 2003, for more details. 
28 The case is certainly reminiscent of the earlier DOJ anti-trust suit against Microsoft involving the tie-in of 
Internet Explorer web browser with the Windows operating system.  Despite the obvious parallels between the 
       28In my model, there are two intermediaries competing for market share within each 
group.
29  There is free entry in the market for content provision.  Content providers are 
heterogeneous in their fixed cost of creating content which need to be incurred twice if they 
multi-home, i.e., make their contents available in digital form on both platforms.   The 
choice of consumers’ platform is analyzed by adopting the Hotelling model of product 
differentiation in which the two platforms are located at the two extreme points of a line.   
Consumers are uniformly distributed along the line and  each consumer’s utility of 
participating in a platform depends on the number of content providers on the same 
platform.   
  In this model I compare the market outcomes under tying and no tying and provide a 
welfare analysis.  There are three channels through which tying can affect social welfare due 
to the monopolization of both sides of the market.   First, all consumers patronize the tying 
firm’s platform.  This implies that there is less variety in the market.  As a result, there are 
less desirable matches between the consumers and platforms, leading to higher overall 
“transportation costs.” Second, content is provided only on the tying firm’s platform, 
whereas the same content was produced on both platforms in the absence of tying.  Thus, 
there are savings in duplication costs under tying.  Third, the number of entrants in the 
content side of the market that determines the availability of content can differ across 
regimes.   The first effect is negative while the second effect is positive.  The sign of the 
                                                                                                                                                      
two cases, there seems to be a major difference between the earlier case involving the tie-in of web browsers 
and the current case of tie-ins of the media player with respect to compatibility between software of 
competitors.   More specifically, any web pages can be accessed either by Internet Explorer or Netscape 
browsers.  Thus, from the perspective of content providers, it does not matter which program viewers use to 
access their sites, and the two-sidedness of the market is lacking.  In the media player software case, however, 
competing platforms are incompatible.  Any media content created and encoded by RealNetworks software 
such as RealProducder can be played only by RealPlayer and the same applies for the Microsoft’s Media 
Player platform.    
29 The model is a modification of the framework developed by Armstrong (2002) and Rochet and Tirole 
(2003a).   
       29third effect is ambiguous.  The coordination of consumers on the tying firm’s platform 
enhances the incentive to enter the content side of the market.  However, the tying firm’s 
pricing decision in that side of the market can offset this positive effect.  The preliminary 
result thus suggests that the welfare implications of tying depend on the relative magnitude 
of inter-group externalities and the extent of product differentiation.  If the extent of inter-
group externalities is significant compared to that of product differentiation, tying can be 
welfare-enhancing since the benefit from internalizing the inter-group network externalities 
outweighs the loss of product variety.  Otherwise, tying reduces welfare.  
  Tying can be a very effective mechanism through which a dominant firm in a related 
market can penetrate one side of the two-sided market to gain an advantage in competition 
for the other side.   As such, we are expected to observe more tying cases in two-sided 
markets, and it is essential to understand the impacts of tying on competition in such 
markets and their welfare consequences.   Both Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Choi (2004), 
however, are tailored to analyze specific cases of the payment card and media software 
industries, respectively.  It would be desirable to develop a unified and more general 
framework that can encompass a variety of two-sided market situations.   
7. Concluding Remarks on Policy Implications 
I have conducted a selective review of recent developments in the theory of tying.   
Traditionally, tying arrangements have received a harsh treatment in the US courts and had 
a status very close to per se violation for a long time with the leverage theory being the key 
intellectual rationale behind such treatment.   The criticisms originating from the Chicago 
school, however, exposed the logical flaws of the theory and instead stressed the efficiency 
rationale for tying, which led to a more benign view of such arrangements.  The subsequent 
literature has refined the classical leverage theory by identifying conditions under which 
       30tying can be used to preserve monopoly power or extend monopoly power in one market to 
another, showing that the Chicago school argument can break down in a variety of settings.   
The welfare implications of tying arrangements are in general ambiguous because 
tying could have efficiency effects even when it has harmful exclusionary effects.   
Microsoft’s tying of Internet Explorer and Media Player with its operating system is a case 
in point.   The literature suggests that such technical tying can be exclusionary.  At the same 
time, however, there may be offsetting effects of tying such as enhanced performance due to 
a seamless integration of products and reduced costs of distribution if the tying good and the 
tied good are often used. 
As such, there seems to be a consensus emerging among economists that tying 
should not be treated as per se violation of antitrust laws and that the rule of reason should 
be adopted in the assessment of tying arrangements.
30   However, beyond the general 
principle that any sensible antitrust policy should balance possible efficiency effects against 
potential anti-competitive effects, it seems to be an elusive goal to come up with a simple 
legal standard to apply in antitrust cases since the appropriate antitrust policy will depend on 
the specifics of the case.    
 
  
                                                 
30 See Motta (2004) and Tirole (2004). 
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       34Appendix: The Analysis of Asymmetric Cost Structures in Section 4 
  In the Appendix, I analyze the case where the two firms are asymmetric in their 
initial costs.  Otherwise, I retain all the assumptions in Section 4.  Furthermore, I assume 
that the realization of R&D outcome is uniformly distributed; if a firm with a current unit 
cost of c performs R&D, the outcome of which will be a random variable c  distributed 
uniformly over [0,c].  When the two firms differ in their initial costs, this specification 
captures the following features of R&D process:  
Diminishing Returns to R&D.  When a firm with a current unit cost of c invests in R&D, the 
expected cost saving is given by c/2.   As the original cost level c approaches to the limit 
zero, the expected cost saving or improvement from R&D decreases.  
 Experience Effects.  However, the final expected cost (Post R&D cost) will be smaller for a 
firm with a lower initial production cost (Pre R&D cost). 
The analysis in this Appendix runs parallel to the one in Section 4, which can be considered 
as a special case of the analysis in the Appendix. 
A.1. No Bundling  
  To analyze how the incentives for R&D depends on the initial cost structure, 
suppose that the initial costs of the two firms are given by cL and cH, where cL < cH.  The 
firm with the initial cost of cL (cH) is called the low (high) cost firm. Let me denote the 
R&D decision of firm i by Ii ∈{0, I}, i =L, H.  Let πi(Ii, Ij) be the expected profit for firm i 
when its investment level is given by Ii and the other firm’s investment level is given by Ij, 
where i, j =L, H, and j≠i.  Then, 
πH(I, I) = E[x-y | x>y] – I,  
       35where x and y denote post R&D cost for the low cost firm and the high cost firm, 
respectively.  By using the fact that x is uniformly distributed on [0, cL] and y is uniformly 
distributed on [0, cH],  
  πH (I, I) = E(x|x>y] – E[y|x>y] – I  
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By proceeding in a similar manner, I have 
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Thus, I can draw the following payoff matrix as in Figure A-1.  
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Figure A-1. The Payoff Matrix of the R&D Game with Non-bundling 
A straightforward calculation yields the following result. 
Proposition A1. Without bundling, the equilibrium in R&D is characterized in the 
following way. 
The large Efficiency Gap Case  (γ = cH/ cL >5/3) 
  In this case, the equilibrium is unique and is characterized in the following way. 
(i)If I ∈ L = [0, 
γ 6
L c
], both firms invest in R&D.   






], only the low cost firm invest in R&D.  
(iii)If I ∈ H = [
γ 6
L c
, ∞), neither firm invests in R&D. 
The Small Efficiency Gap Case (γ = cH/ cL <5/3) 
  In this case, the same behavior as in the large gap case constitutes as an equilibrium 
behavior.  But the equilibrium is not unique for the intermediate values of I.  More 
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       37(m ⊂ M ).  If I ∈ m, there are two additional equilibria, one in pure strategies where only 
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A.2. Bundling 
  Once again, let me make the assumption that sA= vA − cA is sufficiently large that x1 
− sA is always less than x2.
  Then, firm 2 has no incentive to invest in R&D since it knows 
that it will be completely foreclosed from market B. Given this fact, the tying firm will 
invest in R&D if and only if I is less than cB1 /2, which is the expected cost saving from 
R&D. 
Proposition A2. With bundling, the rival firm has no incentive to engage in R&D whereas 
the tying firm engages in R&D if its expected cost saving from R&D outweighs the cost of 
R&D investment (I <cB1/2). 
For the analysis of the first-best socially optimal configuration of R&D decisions, I first 
note that if only one firm is to invest in R&D, it should be the low cost firm for efficiency.  
This follows from the assumption of experience effects in the R&D process.   Thus, we can 
consider three possible configurations of R&D investment.  If both firms invest in R&D, the 
expected total cost of product B is given by  E [Min (x, y)] + 2I, where x is uniformly 
distributed on [0, cL] and y is uniformly distributed on [0, cH].  If only the low cost firm 
invests in R&D, the expected total cost is E[x] + I.  Finally, if nobody invests in R&D, the 
total cost is simply cL.   This leads me to the following Proposition. 
Proposition A3. The socially optimal configuration of R&D investment is given by: 
 (i)If I ∈ L = [0, 
γ 6
L c
], both firms should invest in R&D.   






], only the low cost firm should invest in R&D.  
(iii)If I ∈ H = [
γ 6
L c
, ∞), neither firm should invest in R&D. 
  The comparison of Propositions A1-A3 reveals that the private R&D incentives are 
more closely aligned with the socially optimal incentives under bundling when the cost 
asymmetry is taken into account.  The social incentives and private incentives coincide 
without bundling in the case of large efficiency gap, and also in the small efficiency gap 
case to the extent that the equilibrium with the low cost firm investing is chosen in the case 
of multiple equilibria parameter region.  Thus, bundling will distort efficiency in R&D 
decision if it changes the incentives. 
With the knowledge in hand of how the R&D competition and the price competition 
play out under bundling and non-bundling, I can now analyze the incentive to bundle for 
firm 1.  I consider two cases depending on whether or not the monopolistic supplier of 
product A is also initially more efficient supplier of product B. 
 
1.  Firm 1 is initially more efficient than firm 2 in market B (cB1 < cB2) 
In this case, it has been shown that bundling has no (harmful) effect on the tying firm’s 
profits without R&D considerations.  Since bundling eliminates the incentives to invest 
in R&D for the rival firm, bundling will guarantee that the tying firm maintains a cost 
advantage in market B.  Thus, there is no adverse effect of bundling from the price 
competition.   The only effect from bundling is to reduce the R&D incentives of the rival 
firm.   I can conclude that firm 1 always has the incentive to bundle if it has an initial 
cost advantage in product B.  
       39 
2.  Firm 1 is initially less efficient than firm 2 in market B  (cB1 > cB2) 
In this case, it is still possible that the tying firm turns out to have a higher production 
cost even after it invests in R&D while the rival firm did not.  Thus, the monopolistic 
supplier of A has to consider the negative consequences of price competition in its 
bundling decision.  Only when the beneficial effects of bundling in capturing dynamic 
rents outweighs the negative effects of price competition, it will bundle.  Moreover, the 
portion of R&D benefits in cost reduction used to catch up with the rival firm’s cost, 
which is (γ−1) does not contribute to the net profit.  Thus, firm 1 will choose to bundle 
only when its initial cost disadvantage is not sufficiently large.  A straightforward 
calculation of firm 1’s profits under bundling and nonbundling yields the result that firm 
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2 , firm 1 (weakly) prefers to bundle. If I ∈ L, 
bundling unambiguously reduces welfare by eliminating the R&D incentives of the rival 
firm.  If I ∈M, there are two cases to consider. 
Case 1. cB1 < cB2 







<5/3, bundling can increase welfare by serving as a coordinating 
mechanism in the R&D game.  
Case 2. cB1 > cB2 









2 , bundling reduces welfare by inducing the less efficient firm 
to invest in R&D at the expense of R&D investment by the more efficient firm. 







<5/3, the welfare consequences of bundling depends on the selection of 
equilibrium under nonbundling.  If the equilibrium is the one in which only the more 
efficient rival firm invests in R&D, bundling reduces welfare.  However, the mixed strategy 
equilibrium is played, bundling partially solves a coordination failure problem and improves 
welfare. 
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